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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF
PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES AND

CAUSES IN NORTH CAROLINA
HENRY BRANDIS, JR.* AND WILLIAM E. GRAHAM,

JR.t

INTRODUCTION
This article is intended as a supplement to a more comprehensive
article which appeared in the Review in 1946.' Its objective is to bring
down to date the rules and lines of authority then discussed. No effort
will be made to present a complete or rounded picture of joinder problems. No phase of the subject will be treated unless it is affected by
cases decided since the 1946 article was written.
The number of joinder questions brought to the North Carolina
Supreme Court is sufficient to indicate practicing attorneys must consider such questions rather frequently. It is hoped that this supplemental article will be of some assistance to attorneys in their search for
authorities.
PARTIES PLAINTIFF
Consistent interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the
relief demanded permits joinder of parties plaintiff,2 though their rights
are several, at least for some purposes. For example, it was held that a'
bailor and bailee have a sufficiently common interest in the subject of
action and relief sought to permit them to join in an action for the
wrongful conversion of the bailed property 3 But where the trial court
allowed the joinder of certain plaintiffs in a taxpayer's action to have
the city enjoined from tearing down a housing project, the Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that the complaint of the additional parties
* Professor of Law and Dean of the School of Law, University of North Carolina.
t Associate Editor, NORTIr CAROLINA LAW REVIEW.
I Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25
N. C. L. REv. 1 (1946). In general, the same topical headings are used herein as
in the 1946 article. Omission of a topic indicates that there have been no further
cases. With rare exceptions, no specific reference to the 1946 article will be made,
as the topical headings will readily enable the reader to proceed from either article
to the other. Reference should also be made to Brandis, A Plea for Adoption by
North Carolina of the FederalJoinder Rides, 25 N. C. L. REv. 245 (1947).
'Burton v. Reidsville, 240 N. C. 577, 581, 83 S. E. 2d 651, 653 (1954). "True
the unity or identity of interest required at common law is not necessary under the
code (G. S. 1-68, 1-70; Wilson v. Motor Lines 207 N. C. 263, 176 S. E. 750) but
two or more plaintiffs representing opposing interests with reference to the main
purpose of the action may not be joined."
'Peed v. Burleson's Inc., 242 N. C. 628, 89 S. E. 2d 256 (1955).
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alleged facts in opposition to those of the original complaint. The Court
defendants. 4
did not decide whether they could have been joined as
When an insurer has been subrogated to a part of an insured's claim,
he may join as plaintiff; and, while it is proper for the insured alone to
sue for the entire claim, it is also proper for the trial judge, in his discretion, to order the insurer to come in, as an additional plaintiff or
5
defendant, upon motion of an original party.
PARTIEs DEFENDANT

In the area"of contract litigation, joinder of a guarantor of payment
with the principal debtor has been sustained, even though his obligation,
0
as distinguished from that of a surety, may be separate and independent.
Joinder of several defendants in a tort action is permitted as a mat7
ter of course if the Court finds them to be joint tort-feastors. This is
true not only in cases where joint tort-feasors are entitled to contribution
as between themselves,8 but also in cases where one defendant is only
secondarily liable and therefore entitled to full recovery from his codefendant.9 Thus, in the ordinary case, joinder of master and servant
is permitted, though the master's liability is predicated solely upon the
respondeat superior doctrine.
However, because of the exclusive character of the remedy provided
by the Workmen's Compensation Act, the plaintiff's employer, if covered
by the act, may not be made a defendant either originally or upon motion
of a party, and this is true whether the attempt is merely to join the
employer with plaintiff's negligent fellow-employee or to join him
(whether as an independent actor or because of respondeat superior)
as a joint tort-feasor, or on a primary liability theory with a defendant
not in the business family.10
'Burton v. Reidsville, 240 N. C. 577, 83 S. E. 2d 651 (1954). See, Case Survey,
34 N. C. L. Rmv. 1, 15-16 (1955).
Taylor v. Green, 242 N. C. 156, 87 S. E. 2d 11 (1955) ; Lyon and Sons v. Bd.

of Education, 238 N. C. 24, 76 S. E. 2d 553 (1953) ; Jackson v. Baggett, 237 N. C.
554, 75 S. E. 2d 532 (1953); Burgess v. Trevathan, 236 N. C. 157, 72 S. E. 2d
See also Note, 31 N. C. L. REv. 224 (1953).
231 (1952).
e Aready Farms Milling Co. v. Wallace, 242 N. C. 686, 89 S. E. 2d 413 (1955).
Midkiff v. Auto Racing, Inc., 240 N. C. 470, 82 S. E. 2d 417 (1954) ; Snowden
v. Wooten, 234 N. C. 111, 66 S. E. 2d 693 (1951); McHorney v. Wooten, 234 N. C.
110, 66 S. E. 2d 692 (1951) ; Barber v. Wooten, 234 N. C. 107, 66 S. E. 2d 690
(1951); Stowe v. Gastonia, 231 N. C. 157, 56 S. E. 2d 413 (1949) ; McKinney v.
Deneen Co., 231 N. C. 540, 58 S. E. 2d 107, (1950) ; Garrett v. Garrett, 228 N. C.
530, 46 S. E. 2d 302 (1948); Moses v. Morganton, 195 N. C. 92, 141 S. E. 484
(1928); Moses v. Morganton, 192 N. C. 102, 133 S. E. 421 (1926).
8
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953).
The Court continues to hold that a third party alleged to be primarily liable,
may be brought in upon the original defendant's motion and demand for judgment
over. This is upon equitable principles, completely apart from statutory provisions.
Davis v. Radford, 233 N. C. 283, 63 S. E. 2d 822 (1951) ; Wright's Clothing Store
v. Ellis Stone and Co., 233 N. C. 126, 63 S. E. 118 (1951).
"0N. C. GEN. STAT. 97-10 (1953). Hunsucker v. Chair Co., 237 N. C. 559, 75
S. E. 2d 768 (1953); Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N. C. 663, 73 S. E. 2d 886 (1953).
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ALTERNATIVE JOINDER

In dealing with alternative joinder of defendants, G. S. § 1-69 states:
"If the plaintiff is in d1oubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to
redress, he may join two or more defendants to determine which is
liable." This was held to justify joinder of a deputy sheriff, the sheriff,
the bondsman of both, and the alleged private employers of the deputy
in an action for false arrest by the deputy." The theory was that the
plaintiff was uncertain whether the deputy was acting as public officer
or private employee at the time of the arrest.
No comparable reference to uncertainty appears in G. S. § 1-68, dealing with alternative joinder of plaintiffs, but authorization of alternative
joinder seems necessarily to include the possibility of uncertainty.
Nevertheless, when two plaintiffs, apparently uncertain as to which was
the real party in interest, alleged ostensibly exclusive rights to recover
on the same claim, the Court did not treat this situation as presenting
alternative joinder of parties, but rather held it to present a misjoinder
2
of parties and causes requiring dismissal.'
This case will be more fully considered under "Alternative Joinder"
in that section of this article dealing with "Joinder of Parties and
Causes."
II JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION
Decision on a potential joinder of causes problem can be rendered
unnecessary by a finding that, though the complaint contains allegations
constituting grounds for separate causes, plaintiff only contends for one
cause,13 apparently inserting the other allegations to elaborate his claim
and as bearing on the issue of injury and damages. 14
Possibly the Court's most liberal use of this technique is found in
G. S. §97-9 has been construed to bring an employee's superiors within the same
immunity as that afforded employers, thereby precluding their joinder.

Bass v.

Ingold, 232 N. C. 295, 60 S. E. 2d 114 (1950Y ; Essick v. Lexington, 232 N. C. 200
(1950).
*xState ex rel Cain v. Corbett, 235 N. C. 33, 69 S. E. 2d 20 (1952).
1. Foote v. Davis, 230 N. C. 422, 53 S. E. 2d 311 (1949).

12 E.g., where the action was to recover excess taxes paid during different years.
Rand v. Wilson, 243 N. C. 43, 89 S. E. 2d 779 (1955). Conversely, the Court
sometimes treats an action as involving several causes when it could easily be said
to involve a single cause. While an example of this will occasionally be pointed
out, this article will not attempt to discuss what constitutes a single cause of action.
" Heath v. Kirkman, 240 N. C. 303, 82 S. E. 2d 104 (1954) ; State ex rel Cain
v. Corbett, 235 N. C. 33, 69 S. E. 2d 20 (1952); Lillian Knitting Mills Co. v.
Earle, 233 N. C. 74, 62 S. E. 2d 492 (1950). In one case where the Court decided
that allegations were sufficient to state several causes of action, it held that the
pleader could not successfully contend that only one cause of action was stated,
with the other allegations being material only insofar as they related to the question
of damages. Snotherly v. Jenrette, 232 N. C. 605, 61 S. E. 2d 708 (1950). This,
however, should be contrasted with the acceptance of such a contention in State
ex rel Cain v. Corbett, Supra, the Court stating that it constituted an election of
remedies. In this respect, the two cases are irreconcilable.
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the recent case of Casey v. Granthamn,15 where an action was brought
(1) against a partner for an accounting and settling of partnership
from foreaffairs; and (2) to enjoin the trustee and the beneficiary
16
property.
partnership
the
on
trust
of
closing a deed
Where the Court finds that there are several causes of action, the
propriety of their joinder is governed by G. S. § 1-123, which permits
joinder of causes, whether legal or equitable in nature, provided the
causes joined all fall within one of the seven classes specified and do not
require separate places of trial. If these requirements are met, no
joinder problem will be encountered as between a single plaintiff and
a single defendant, regardless of how complicated the facts may be. For
example, the contract action class has permitted a plaintiff to allege in
a single complaint that defendant breached two separate contracts to
lend money; that he charged usurious interest on each contract; and
that the breach of each contract resulted in farm losses for which plain7
tiff was entitled to actual and punitive damages.'
IMPROPER JOINDER OF CAUSES
The most difficult question arises in the interpretation of the clause in
G. S. § 1-123 permitting joinder of causes arising out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action. Such
question arises with relative frequency because this is the only clause
in the section which permits joinder of tort and contract causes.
"Transaction" and "subject of action," while now familiar and somewhat hallowed, are nevertheless vague and nebulous criteria. They may
be, and from time to time are, construed either very broadly or narrowly
and technically. Fact situations are so diverse that those somewhat
diverse approaches can be pursued without such obvious inconsistency as
to bring about different decisions on identical facts.
'1 239
N. C. 121, 79 S. E. 2d 735 (1954).
The complaint alleged that the deed of trust in question covered property belonging to the plaintiff as well as partnership property, and that the partnership

property was sufficient to pay the debt. A majority of the Court believed that since,
under the doctrine of marshalling of assets, plaintiff was entitled to have the partnership property first applied to the payment of the debt, he was entitled to have
foreclosure enjoined until the accounting. In a long dissent by justice Johnson, in

which Justice Winborne concurred, it was insisted inter alia that (1) two causes

of action were involved; and (2) such joinder would delay an innocent creditor
from collecting a loan while two partners engaged in an action that did not affect
the creditor's right to collect. Actually, the complaint contined allegations of
collusion between the defendant partner and the creditor (his father) which should

have permitted joinder even if two causes of action were present. • It is doubtful,
however, that the allegations-conclusions of law for the most part-were sufficient
to state a cause of action against the creditor. At any rate, it is possible that in
a subsequent case of this nature, where there is no possible inference of collusion,
the Court will find two causes of action, thus raising a serious dual misjoinder
problem.
" Perry v. Doub, 238 N. C. 233, 77 S. E. 2d 711 (1953).
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In the recent cases, misjoinder has usually been found. 8 While
some of the results were necessitated by the arbitrary restrictions, there
has certainly been no marked tendency to discover any elastic in the
transaction clause.
For example, in Smith v. Gibbons, 19 plaintiff sought to recover (1)
money due under a contract for personal services; arid (2) damages
for assault and false imprisonment committed upon him by defendant
when he visited defendant's office to discuss the matter. Technically, it
is rather clear that the breach of the contract and the alleged torts are
distinct transactions, but it may be rather forcefully argued that they
are transactions connected with the same subject of action-i.e., that the
breach of contract is the subject of the action and that the assault and
false imprisonment are connected therewith, in that they arose out of a
negotiation prompted by the alleged breach.20
Joinder problems have arisen in several cases where one cause was
required to conform to a special statutory procedure which the Court
did not believe could be integrated into the procedure of an ordinary
civil action. 21 There are no recent cases where such procedure has
restricted joinder. In fact, one statutory procedure-under the N. C.
" Mills v. Park Corp., 242 N. C.20, 86 S. E. 2d 893 (1954). A cause of action
against a cemetery for breach of promissory representation and a cause of action
to restrain the enforcement of unlawful and unreasonable rules and regulations in
the management of the property were held improperly joined. (Plaintiff actually
attempted to join five causes of action; however, three were dismissed on appeal as
statements of defective causes of action). Large v. Gardner, 238 N. C. 288, 77
S. E. 2d 617 (1953). It was alleged that defendant cashed plaintiff's check and
plaintiff put the money in his pocket without counting it; that several days later
defendant caused plaintiff to lose his job by falsely accusing him of accepting a large
sum of money in excess of the check, and had him arrested for false pretense.
Plaintiff demanded damages for causing the breach of his employment contract
and for malicious prosecution. The Court, without referring to the transaction
clause, held that defendant's demurrer for (inter alia) misjoinder of causes had
been properly sustained. Three Justices dissented on the ground that the complaint
could be construed to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution. (Actually,
the decision of the majority may have turned on the general faultiness of the complaint rather than a misjoinder problem.) Belch v. Perry, 240 N. C. 764, 84 S. E.
2d 186 (1954). The Court intimated that a cause of action against defendant for
breach of an agreement not to engage in business in competition with plaintiff after
selling his interest in a partnership to plaintiff, and a cause of action for defendant's
fraud in inducing plaintiff to purchase his interest therein, could not be properly
joined. Hancammon v. Carr, 229 N. C. 52, 47 S. E. 2d 614 (1948). (In an action
to recover on a check, defendant maker was not permitted to assert a counterclaim
for abuse of process in which he alleged that plaintiff had procured a warrant
charging him with issuing the allegedly worthless check.) In this case the Court
pointed out the similarity of the transaction clause in the joinder and counterclaim
statutes and clearly intended that its discussion should apply to both. The opinion
is a painstaking effort to explain why the Court regards "connected story" alone as
insufficient. See also, Thompson v. Pilot Life Insurance Co., 234 N. C. 434, 67
S. E. 2d 444 (1951).
" 230 N. C. 600, 54 S. E. 2d 924 (1949). See also Vestal v. White, 229 N. C.
414, 49 S.E. 2d 927 (1948).
2 See the similar discussion in Brandis, supra note 1, p. 12, of Pressly v. Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 226 N. C. 518, 29 S. E. 2d 382 (1946).
" See cases collected in Brandis, supra note 1, pp. 12, 13.
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Betterment Statute-has recently been held to permit a joinder perhaps
not otherwise permissible. 22
Inconsistency may be the source of a joinder problem when the Court
believes that two causes are actually incompatible. A recent illustration
is Perkins v. Langdon,23 where plaintiffs originally alleged that defendants entered into a parol contract to lease tobacco warehouses to them
for three years and afterwards sold the warehouses before the lease
expired. Defendants' demurrer was sustained because the complaint
contained no allegations that defendants had covenanted not to sell the
warehouses during the term of the lease. Plaintiffs amended, asserting,
inter alia that the original contract provided for a joint adventure arrangement whereby plaintiffs were to manage and operate the warehouses
for the joint account of plaintiffs and defendants. In striking the amendment, the Court found that it set up a wholly different cause of action,
and furthermore, that the causes could not be joined in the same com24
plaint because inconsistent.
On the other hand, no such incompatibility was found in Jenkins v.
Duckworth2 5 There plaintiffs alleged employment by defendant, successful performance, rendition of an account for services in a stated
amount, a partial payment by defendant prior to rendition of the account,
another partial payment thereafter, and failure and refusal to pay the
balance. By amendment plaintiffs added allegations of performance of
the same employment and allegations that the services rendered were
reasonably worth a specified amount (being the same amount stated in
the account). Since an express contract for the performance of the
services (though not for the amount of compensation) was admitted, the
Court pointed out that they were not alternative causes in express and
implied contract. Nevertheless, the opinion refers to the two sets of
allegations as "counts" and also as "causes of action."
It is not possible to be certain whether the Court thought this represented alternative causes--one for breach of the original contract and
one on an account stated-or merely a single cause of action with alterna22 Comm'rs of Roxboro v. Bumpass, 237 N. C. 143, 74 S. E. 2d 436 (1953).
The Court held that even though neither of two interpleaders had any interest in
the other's claim, a demurrer for misjoinder of parties and causes could not be
sustained. "This for the simple reason the statute under which interpleaders must
proceed, General Statutes Ch. 1, art. 30, requires that a claim for betterments be
filed in the action in which judgment for land has been rendered." Barnhill, J., at
145.
23 233 N. C. 240, 63 S. E. 2d 565 (1951).
-The following language indicates that the Court obviously regarded the complaint and the amendment as completely incompatible: "The allegations of the
complaint seek to establish the relation of landlord and tenant as the basis of recovery. By these amendments, the plaintiffs are endeavoring to set up the alternate
relation of joint adventures. If the one is true, the other cannot be." Johnson, J.,
id. at 246.
26242 N. C. 758, 89 S. E. 2d 47 (1955).
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tive theories supporting the same measure of recovery. It is clear that
the Court saw and approved alternatives of some kind which were inconsistent in the sense that plaintiffs could not conceivably recover on
both.
Perkins v. Langdon and Jenkins v. Duckworth present radically different factual settings. They can obviously be reconciled. Yet they
serve to point up the fact that the distinctive treatise on the limits of
permissible inconsistency in North Carolina has yet to be written-by
the Court or anyone else. It can be said, however, that it is most unfortunate that our Court has not taken notice of the modern trend toward
acceptance of inconsistency, provided, at least, that the alternatives
(whether called counts or causes of action) rest upon obvious uncertainties of legal theory or proof and do not require that plaintiff, on the
witness stand, swear to personal knowledge of the simultaneous coexistence of mutually destructive facts.
CONSEQUENCES OF MISJOINDER OF CAUSES

Although G. S. § 1-127 expressly sets forth misjoinder of causes as
a ground for demurrer, the ensuing consequences are not too serious.
G. S. § 1-132 provides that "the judge shall, upon such terms as are just,
order the action to be divided into as many actions as are necessary for
the proper determination of the causes of action therein misjoined." 26
So with severance as the ultimate possible result of an objection to the
misjoinder of causes, there are probably many cases where defendant's
27
counsel intentionally waives the objection.
III JOINDER OF PARTIES AND CAUSES

The Court continues to hold that joinder will be sustained, even in
complicated situations, if the Court finds that the complaint relates a
"connected story" ;2s or "if the objects of the suit are single, and it happens that different persons have separate interests in distinct questions
which arise out of the single object, it necessarily follows that such
different persons must be brought before the Court in order that the
29
suit may conclude the whole subject."

" The Court has naturally followed this mandate, e.g.: McKinley v. Hinnant,
242 N. C. 245, 87 S. E. 2d 568 (1955) ; Mills V. Park Corp., 242 N. C. 20, 86 S. E.
2d 893 (1955) ; Smotherly v. Jenrette, 232 N. C. 605, 61 S. E. 2d 708 (1950) ; Smith
v. Gibbons, 230 N. C. 600, 54 S. E. 2d 924 (1949). See also Brandis, supra note 1,
n. 71.
27 N. C. Gen. Stat. § 1-134 (1953) provides that when misjoinder of causes appears on the face of the complaint, failure to demur is a waiver of the objection.
"Roberson v. Swain, 235 N. C. 50, 69 S. E. 2d 15 (1952); Owens v. Hines,
227 N. C. 236, 41 S. E. 2d 739 (1947). The several transactions must nevertheless
comply with the wording of G. S. § 1-123 to the effect that all causes must be connected with the same subject of action. Pressley v. Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co., 226 N. C. 518, 519, 39 S. E. 2d 382, 383 (1946).
2" Erickson v. Starling, 233 N. C. 539, 64 S. E. 2d 832 (1951) ; Owens v. Hines,
supra note 28.
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CRaIITOR's BILLS

It is well established in North Carolina that creditors with wholly
independent claims may join as plaintiffs to establish their claims against
their common debtor, provided they share in seeking some common
object designed to protect their recovery-such as a demand that the
debtor's fraudulent conveyance be set aside; and other parties to the
alleged fraud may be made defendants. However, since it is the fraudulent conveyance feature which permits joinder in the above instances,
plaintiffs must be careful to state facts and circumstances sufficient to
sustain the allegation of fraud. Otherwise, they run the risk of having
their entire action dismissed because of dual misjoinder.80
ESTATE LITIGATION

The phrases "connected story" and "single object" are usually used
to justify joinder in litigation involving the assets of an estate. This is
particularly the case where all the relief sought is directly connected with
securing or protecting plaintiff's share of the estate assets, and there is
a central unifying thread such as the provisions of a trust or agreement
or will, or misapplication of funds by the principal defendants (with
which other defendants are somehow connected) 31
Owens v. Hines,32 a case very similar to the creditor's bill type of
situation, illustrates this technique. It was alleged that the defendant
guardian sold lands belonging to plaintiffs, his children, for $4,000 and
loaned and invested the proceeds, in his own name, upon securities not
approved by law. Later he received a deed to other land, with himself
as grantee. When the plaintiffs became of age and demanded title to
this land as part of their estate, defendant allegedly disaffirmed the trust
relationship and executed a deed for the land to his wife. Plaintiffs
joined defendant guardian and his wife and demanded judgment:
(1) for $4,000 with interest from defendant guardian, (2) that defendants hold title to the land as trustees for plaintiffs, (3) that the indebtedness be a specific charge and lien upon the land and (4) that defendant
wife was not the owner of any of the land and was entitled to no right,
title, or interest thereto.
The above facts presented a clear case for the application of the
"connected story" and "single object" principles and the Court had no
trouble finding a proper joinder of parties and causes. Its reasoning
was that the main object was an accounting by defendant guardian for
" Davis v. Whitehurst, 229 N. C. 226, 49 S. E. 2d 394 (1948). An action by
several creditors on independent claims against a common debtor, and to enjoin an
action between defendant and a third party on a contract allegedly "tainted with
fraud
31 . . . on creditors. .. ."
See Brandis, sutpra note 1, pp. 22-25.
32227 N. C. 236, 41 S. E. 2d 739 (1947).
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specific property of plaintiffs, and that the conveyance was directly
connected therewith.
In Erickson v. Starling,33 beneficiaries of a trust consisting of the
controlling stock in a corporation instituted a suit to remove trustees
and to require an accounting. It was alleged, inter alia, that stock in
a subsidiary corporation had been transferred to one of the trustees personally for an inadequate consideration. In affirming the trial court's
order overruling defendants' demurrer, the Court held that plaintiffs
were entitled to maintain a single suit against the trustees and their
confederates, corporate and individual.8 4
These cases illustrate relatively simple situations where plaintiffs
have been allowed to join causes against several parties in order to protect their interest in estate assets from allegedly fraudulent administration. Somewhat more complicated situations may arise where heirs or
next of kin allege numerous causes grounded upon transactions affecting
the distribution of the estate assets.
An unusual illustration of the latter type of case is Johnson v. Scarborough,35 where no less than seven causes against numerous individuals
were crowded into defendants' answer as cross-claims. The action,
brought by certain heirs, with the remaining heirs named as defendants,
was in the form of a special proceeding to partition the real property of
N.V.J., deceased. It appeared that the property in question consisted
of (a) that of which N.V.J. had been sole owner, (b) an interest in real
property devised to him by E.M.J. and (c) an undivided interest in
real property of B.D.J., deceased, inherited by him as heir at law. Two
defendants attempted to assert cross-actions as follows: (1) to have
declared void certain deeds and instruments conveying defendants' interest in the E.M.J. estate, (2) for accountings (a) of rents and profits
derived from the operation of farms by the estate of E.M.J., and (b)
of proceeds from the sale of timber from the estate, (3) to have declared
void deeds conveying defendants' interest in the estate of B.D.J. (4) to
have a prior proceeding, in which lands of E.M.J. were partitioned, declared void; (5) for an accounting against administrators of the estate
of B.D.J. (6) for an accounting against J.R.C., an alleged partner of
E.M.J., for rents and profits accruing after E.M.J.'s death; and (7) for
an accounting against J.T.T. on the ground that he purchased, subsequent to the death of E.M.J., partnership property owned by E.M.J.
and J.R.C. All in all, defendants indicated that they were dissatisfied.
" 233 N. C. 539, 64 S. E. 2d 832 (1951).
"' "The arm of equity is neither short nor palsied when it comes to dealing with
fraud; nor is judicial process or privilege intended to be used as a shield against
ferreting it out or to stay the day of reckoning and judgment, but rather to be
employed, as contemplated, in a single action for investigation of the whole scheme
and the unravelling of its ramifications." Stacy, C. J., id. at 541.
35242 N. C. 681, 89 S. E. 2d 420 (1955).
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The Court dismissed the cross-action in a rather summary fashion
because all causes did not affect all parties. An analysis of the case
indicates that even the most liberal principles would not justify joinder
of all the causes asserted by the defendants. In the first place, the causes
lack a unifying thread like provisions of a trust or will or misapplication
of funds by principal defendants. 86 Secondly, it is obvious that one
connected story cannot be told of the various transactions. For instance,
the causes asserted for the various accountings and the requests to have
certain conveyances of defendants set aside are completely unrelated,
with the interest of the other parties to the petition being in no wise
affected by the latter causes.
Clearly here the defendants asserted ownership of more dirty linen
than could be sent to the laundry in one bundle.
OTHER FRAUD CASES

Where fraud is the gravamen of the action, the plaintiff may ordinarily join all those who participated in the fraud or knowingly profited
by it and may ask for such relief as is necessary to overcome the fraud
and enforce his rights. Thus, where S was allegedly guilty of fraud in
the procurement of a written agreement for the sale of property and
caused a corporation to be formed and title to the property placed in the
corporation, plaintiff could properly enjoin S and the corporation from
conveying the property.T
The recent case of McKinley v. Hinnant" illustrates a situation
where fraud, though alleged, was not broad enough to cover all of the
transactions pleaded. The facts indicate that plaintiff sold certain realty
to H and W, taking a deed of trust on other property to secure a note
for the purchase price. It was alleged that H and W agreed to execute
a mortgage on the conveyed property at a later date as additional security; that plaintiff thereafter borrowed a smaller amount from F, and,
at the suggestion of H and W, transferred their note and deed of trust
as security and took an option to repurchase from F; and that the note
and deed of trust were wrongfully cancelled. In an action against H,
W and F, plaintiff sought (1) to have the transfer of the note and the
option to repurchase declared a mortgage; (2) to have the cancellation
of the note and deed of trust declared void; and (3) to have a purchase
money deed of trust declared on the conveyed property as redress for
breach by H and W of their agreement to execute a mortgage thereon.
3 Even if misapplication by principal defendants were present, it could not be
said that the other defendants were connected therewith.
"'Roberson v. Swain, 235 N. C. 50, 69 S. E. 2d 15 (1952). As previously
pointed out (see note 16, supra) sufficient allegations of fraud would probably have
justified joinder even in the eyes of the minority in the case of Casey v. Grantham,
239 N. C. 121, 79 S. E. 2d 735 (1954).
(The majority found only one cause of
action involved).
8242 N. C. 245, 87 S. E. 2d 568 (1955).
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The defendants demurred for misjoinder of causes only and the Court
ordered the first two causes to be severed from the latter. No objection
was made to the joinder of parties and causes. It is obvious from the
Court's opinion, however, that it believed dual misjoinder to be present,
on the ground that F was not connected with the alleged breach by H
and W of their agreement to execute a mortgage on the conveyed property. This view would seem correct, if that breach was a separate cause
of action, in the light of the restrictive "all causes must affect all Parties"
provision of G. S. § 1-123. It is significant, however, that the alleged
fraudulent circumstances did furnish the cement necessary to join all
of the defendants on the first two causes. And a broad view might well
result in a decision that only a single cause of action is presented--i.e.,
plaintiff seeks, essentially, to protect his rights under his contract of sale
with H and W, and F is a necessary party to one phase of such protection.
GENERAL CONTRACT AND TORT PRINCIPLES
In the tort field, plaintiff may sue several defendants whose acts
combine to produce a single injury, thus making them joint tortfeasors. 9 Actually, in these cases there is usually said to be but a
single cause of action 40
Where the complaint sufficiently alleges conspiracy, there is no joinder problem because as a matter of substantive law the liability of conspirators is joint and several.4 1 Thus, in an action charging several
defendants with conspiring to run plaintiff out of business as a plumber,
the plaintiff was allowed to join the Executive Secretary of the State
Board of Examiners of Plumbing and Heating Contractors, the town
clerk, and members of the Town's Board of Aldermen, alleging various
activities on their part, including the procurement of passage of license
42
ordinance and the criminal prosecution of plaintiff.
" The stream polution cases furnish a good example of this: Stowe v. Gastonia,
(1949) ; McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N. C. 540, 58
S. E. 2d 107 (1950) ; Lineberger v. Gastonia, 196 N. C. 445, 146 S. E. 79 (1929).
" Where the action is grounded on an intentional tort, the Court usually speaks
of a common purpose, intent and concert of action. Garrett v. Garrett, 228 N. C.
530, 46 S. E. 2d 302 (1948). (Plaintiff alleged that one defendant, acting pursuant
to a joint purpose, went to plaintiff's residence, dragged her out of the house to
a point where the other defendant was lying in wait, and both then assaulted her.)
Where the action is for negligence the theory is concurrent negligence. The Court
has stated clearly that neither concert of action nor unity of purpose is necessary.
It is sufficient if the acts of the several defendants, however independent, concur to
produce a single injury. Shaw v. Barnard, 229 N. C. 713, 51 S. E. 2d 295 (1949).
Cf. Midkiff v. Auto Racing, Inc., 240 N. C. 470, 82 S. E. 2d 417 (1954), where
"concert of action" was alleged.
"Muse v. Morrison, 234 N. C. 195, 66 S. E. 2d 783 (1951).
" Ibid. (Plaintiff lost on merits in Muse v. Morrison, 240 N. C. 664, 83 S. E.
2d 705 (1954)). Compare Manley v. Greensboro News Co., 241 N. C. 455, 85 S. E.

231 N. C. 157, 56 S. E. 2d 413

2d 672 (1955), where plaintiff attempted to circumvent a joinder problem by alleg-

ing that an opposing political candidate and the news company conspired in the
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Turning to multiple plaintiffs, it was held, where several property
owners alleged that they had been individually damaged by defendant's
breach of covenants (separate though forming a part of a uniform plan of
development), that joinder was improper.43 From the practical standpoint this result seems unfortunate; but it seems dictated by the requirement that all causes must affect all parties.
In the tort field, the fact that a single tortious act of defendant injured several persons does not, standing alone, permit their joining as
plaintiffs; and the same rule applies even though the only physical injury is to an infant and his father attempts to join his own cause for
loss of services and expenses incurred with the infant's cause, brought
by the father as next friend. 44
JOINT VERSUS SEVERAL ToRTS

As has already been indicated, plaintiff may join several defendants
in joint tort-feasor situations-where the acts of defendants concur to
produce a single injury. No joinder is
allowed, however, if the de45

fendants' acts produce separate injuries.
A difficulty in this area arises when plaintiff is injured by the nonsimultaneous actions of the drivers of two or more vehicles. A leading
case illustrating this problem is Atkins v. Steed,40 where it was alleged
that plaintiff was knocked from the running board of vehicle A by the
negligence of the driver of vehicle B, and that while unconscious on the
highway, as the result of the blow "just previously received," the driver
of vehicle C negligently ran into him. In an action against the drivers
publication of libel. It was held that non-suit was properly entered by the trial
court on the grounds that there was no evidence of conspiracy, and that libel is an
individual tort incapable of joint commission.
,' Chambers v. Dalton, 238 N. C. 142, 76 S. E. 2d 162 (1953). The Court, in
a per curiam opinion, regarded the several causes of action as completely separate
and distinct with their only relation being that they were of the same nature and
asserted the same general type of grievance. A taxpayer's equity action was met
with a similar type of reasoning in Branch v. Bd. of Education, 233 N. C. 623, 65
S. E. 2d 124 (1951). There taxpayers sought to enjoin allegedly unlawful expenditures or diversions of funds belonging to four separate school administrative units
and to compel an allocation of such funds to the respective units. Actually, the
complaint was demurrable for other reasons; however, the Court reasoned that
four independent causes of action belonging to four governmental agencies could
not properly be joined, unless there was controversy as to the respective shares of
the several units in the fund in question.
" See Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N. C. 159, 86 S. E. 2d 925 (1955). Compare
Shields v. McKay, 241 N. C. 37, 84 S. E. 2d 286 (1954). Here the only cause was
that on behalf of the infant, brought by the father as next friend. The complaint
alleged elements of damage properly recoverable by the father in his capacity as
parent, as distinguished from next friend. Defendant failed to demur or to move
to strike. The Court held that in such a situation the father is considered to have
waived his right to recover therefor. For this reason, it was held to be error for
the Court ex inero iiwtu to limit the recovery for loss of earning capacity and
medical expenses to the period after the infant reached majority.
"See Note, 31 N. C. L. Rev. 237 (1953).
48208 N. C. 245, 179 S. E. 889 (1935).
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of vehicles B and C, the Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Stacy writing
the opinion, dismissed the case for dual misjoinder, regarding it as a
suit for two injuries, not one, and an attempt to join different causes of
action against different parties.
In a subsequent case, Barber v. Wooten,47 a slightly more complicated fact situation seems analagous, but joinder was allowed. There
it was alleged that, immediately after a collision caused by the negligence
of the intestate of one defendant, and while plaintiff was injured and
unable to extricate herself from the car in which she was a passenger,
another defendant negligently ran his truck into the car causing further
injury, and that shortly thereafter the third defendant ran into the side
of the car causing still further injuries. The opinion of Chief Justice
Stacy appears to distinguish the two cases on the grounds that in the
"running board" case, although plaintiff asked for a "joint" recovery,
this complaint indicated that the negligence of one defendant had come
to an end before the negligence of the other defendant occurred and
contained no allegation of joint and concurrent torts as did the complaint
in the Barber case.48 An inference can certainly be drawn that the addition of the words "joint and concurrent" would have saved the plaintiff's
complaint in the "running board" case.
Regardless of the wording of the complaint with respect to "joint
and concurrent," it is obvious that the time element is an important
49
factor in multiple battery situations.
The time element was also emphasized in another type of situation,
where plaintiff's intestate, in a drunken condition, was allegedly wrongfully ejected from one bus and shortly thereafter struck by a bus of
another carrier. Joinder of the two carriers was held improper. The
Court stated: "While the plaintiff does not make any allegations as to
the length of time which expired between the two events, it does appear
on the face of the complaint that the deceased, after being discharged
from the Transit Line bus, went at least one block before he was struck
234 N. C. 107, 66 S. E. 2d 690 (1951).
"8In this general type of situation, unless the tort-feasors are all joint tortfeasors, determining the damages they respectively cause is extremely difficult. In
a wrongful death case it is impossible. This latter seems to have been recognized
in two companion cases to the Barber case. In the first, McHorney v. Wooten,
234 N. C. 110, 66 S.E. 2d 692 (1951), Stacy, C. J. stated at 111: "This case affords
perhaps a clearer, if not a more pronounced distinction from the Atkins case ....
than does the Barber case. Here the action is for the wrongful death of plaintiff's
intestate-the result of the sum total of all the torts, neglects or defaults of the
defendants which culminated in the right given by the 'Lord Campbell Act.'" The
second case, Snowden v. Wooten, 234 N. C. 111, 66 S.E. 2d 693 (1951), was another wrongful death arising from the same collision.
"In Barber v. Wooten, 234 N. C. 107, 110, 66 S.E. 2d 690, 692 (1951), Barnhill J., concurring, said: "It does not appear on the face of the complaint that
there was any appreciable interval of time between the three collisions. Hence
the question defendants seek to raise is not presented by demurrer."
1'
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by the bus of defendant Greyhound Corporation. The two events alleged were entirely distinct in point of time and circumstance."5 0
Here there is no succession of physical impacts with a consequent
question as to whether all defendants are jointly liable for plaintiff's total
damage or each is independently liable for a part. As the Court pointed
out, the liability of the first carrier, if any, was grounded primarily upon
breach of its carrier's contract; and the essential question was whether
the passenger's subsequent death could be attributed to that breach. If
it could be, then joinder would seem to be perfectly proper, despite lapse
of time. However, the elapsed time in the case was sufficient to make
that an important (but only one) factor in determining that the death
could not be attributed to the first carrier's breach. Hence, no cause
of action for wrongful death was stated against the first carrier; and
the Court so held, dismissing the action as to it while allowing the case
to continue against the second carrier. Thus, while joinder was said to
be improper, the decision is in fact a resolution of questions concerning
substantive rights.
In other words, in the multiple battery cases the time element seems
to influence the Court's decision as to whether the injury is single or
multiple. When, as in the bus case, it is clear that the injury is single,
the time element is directly related to the issue of proximate cause. How
much weight it will be given on that issue depends upon the particular
factual context; but it is clear that, in some factual contexts, independent
acts of several defendants may concur to produce a single injury in such
a way as to make them joint tort-feasors, though the acts are widely
separated in time. 51
RULES

APPLY TO DEFENDANT'S PLEADINGS

The requirement that all causes must affect all parties continues to
apply to cross-claims, cross-actions and counterclaims ;52 and the Court
continues to hold that a defendant in a motor vehicle accident case may
not cross-claim against codefendants for his own personal injuries or
property damage incurred in the same accident. 3
Thus, in Wrenn v. Graham, 4 plaintiff sued the driver of another
car and two contractors, alleging them to be joint tort feasors. De'0Shaw v. Barnard, 229 N. C. 713, 51 S. E. 2d 295 (1949). '
" See, for example, Yandell v. Fireproofing Corp., 239 N. C. 1, 79 S. E. 2d 223
(1953).
"Though usage is not standard in North Carolina, in this article, for clarity
"counterclaim"' will be used to signify a claim by a defendant against a plaintiff and
"cross-claim"' or "cross-action"' will signify a claim by one defendant against another defendant.

"An exception to this is that, when the original defendant has another joined,
the latter may cross-claim against the original defendant. Grant v. McGraw, 228
N. C. 745, 46 S. E. 2d 849 (1948).
"1236 N. C. 719, 74 S. E. 2d 232 (1953).
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fendant driver counterclaimed against plaintiff and cross-claimed against
his codefendants, alleging all of them to be joint tort-feasors. Upon
demurrer and motion to strike filed by the codefendants, the Court
dismissed the cross-claim, leaving the counterclaim to continue.
The most cursory analysis of the situation clearly demonstrates that
dismissal cannot validly be predicated on the requirement that all causes
must affect all parties. There is plainly no violation of that requirement.
Defendant driver's allegation that plaintiff and the codefendants were
5
affecting all parties
joint tort-feasors is only a single cause of action,m
in exactly the same manner in which plaintiff's similar cause affects
them. This might not be true if defendant interposed a cross-claim only;
but that is not the case here. Indeed, dismissal of the cross-action, leaving the counterclaim pending, creates a situation in which, technically,
the counterclaim cause does not affect all parties. 56
The other objection accepted by the Court as justifying dismissal was
that: "A plaintiff may not be required to cool his heels in the anteroom
while defendants fight out, by cross-action, a claim, one against the other,
which is independent of and irrelevant to the cause he asserts. '57 With
all due respect to the Court, it is most doubtful that the cross-claim is
"independent of and irrelevant to" plaintiff's cause.
In the collision cases the Court has made it plain that if a defendant
wishes to claim against the plaintiff, based upon the same collision, he
must do so by counterclaim and may not maintain an independent
action.r 8 Here his claim against the plaintiff and his codefendant as
joint tort-feasors is a single cause of action.59 It is most difficult to see,
therefore, why any facet of this single cause, one facet of which is a
11 Cases cited, supra, notes 38 and 39.
" 'Upon certain assumptions, the counterclaim cause has a practical effect upon
plaintiff's cause against the codefendants. That is, if defendant driver wins on his
counterclaim, it necessarily will mean a finding of such negligence on plaintiff's
part as to bar his claim against everybody. However, if defendant driver loses on
the counterclaim, that does not necessarily affect the codefendants.
Of course, the purpose of pointing out that the counterclaim does not affect all
parties is not to support a conclusion that the counterclaim should not be allowed.
The purpose is to point up the peculiar reasoning involved in finding a misjoinder
is present for a reason which did not exist before the finding, but does exist thereafter.

57236 N. C. 719, 721, 74 S. E. 2d 232 (1953).
" Johnson v. Smith, 215 N. C. 322, 1 S. E. 2d 834 (1939) ; Morrison v. Lewis,
197 N. C. 79, 147 S. E. 729 (1929) ; Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S. E. 545
(1919).

'1Actually, the rule is that a plaintiff may sue joint tort-feasors jointly or
separately. Thus, while plaintiff's claim is a single cause for purposes of joinder,
it is not such for purposes of enforcing the rule against splitting a single cause. It
is clear therefore that defendant driver may pursue his remedy against the codefendants in an independent action (though, depending upon developments in the
present case, relitigation of certain issues may be foreclosed). However, that
requires him to split what he could properly treat as a single cause if he had beaten
plaintiff to the draw. This enforced splitting does not demonstrate that his claim
is irrelevant to the plaintiff's claim.
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compulsory counterclaim, should be labeled "independent of and irrelevant" to plaintiff's cause of action.60
The result is that the Court, having deprived defendant driver of the
right to sue plaintiff in an independent action, 61 now deprives him also
of the privilege of pursuing, at one time, his claim against plaintiff and
other alleged joint tort-feasors already in the case at plaintiff's instance
and alleged by plaintiff to have been negligent. In other words, in this
litigation, plaintiff may sue any number of tort-feasors, but a defendant
may sue only one-plaintiff. If any practical advantage is here involved,
what has plaintiff done to merit it? Is it to be the laurel wreath awarded
to the winner of an unseemly race from the bloody highway to the courthouse?
Further, it is here most difficult to believe that plaintiff will be forced
to "cool his heels in the anteroom" while the defendants have their little
private bicker. Plaintiff's cause and defendant driver's counterclaim
include all the issues which might be involved in the cross-claim-the
negligence of each party and the damages of plaintiff and defendant
driver. Therefore, addition of the cross-claim could not involve serious
additional complications. A general melee, with fingers pointing hopefully in all directions, is already insured.
Refusing to try the entire controversy at once, leaving it possible that
there may be a second litigation between the defendants, seems a potential waste of public and private time and money.62 And solicitude for
the plaintiff so tender as to counterbalance all contrary considerations
seems particularly quixotic in view of the fact that the objection to the
cross-claim did not come from the plaintiff. 63 His counsel was not even
sufficiently concerned to appear in the Supreme Court.
Finally, the Court asserted that it only applies the statute as written
and, if such cross-claim is to be permitted the legislature must amend
the statutes to authorize it. But no statute prohibits what was attempted
here. The Court itself seems to indicate that this is true, referring to the
"0In the Wrenn case, defendant driver's counsel presented the argument, made
in the text of this article, based upon the joint tort-feasor status of plaintiff and the
codefendants.

The Court labeled it "interesting" and "ingenious but not persuasive."

This leaves us with more than a slight suspicion that this article will be no more
persuasive-but also with the belief that the opinion fails to point out any fallacy
in counsel's analysis.
" The opinion in Wrenn v. Graham refers to the possibility of an independent
suit by the defendant driver against the plaintiff and the contractors. But the
cases cited in note 58 supra held that he cannot sue the plaintiff in an independent
action.
" The Court recognized that if defendant driver sued his codefendants in an

independent action, the two actions might then be consolidated; but it also recognized that this is not the equivalent of joinder in a single action.
" This was also true in Horton v. Perry, 229 N. C. 319, 49 S. E. 2d 734 (1948).
So far as plaintiff is concerned the usual rule should apply-that is, failure to
object is a waiver.
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inability of plaintiffs to join for their respective injuries.6 4 There is a
statutory basis for preventing such joinder, since neither plaintiff's cause
affects the other. But, as already pointed out, in the instant case, there
is no cause which does not affect all parties. Perhaps the Court meant
that the codefendants are placed in much the same position as if plaintiff
and defendant driver had joined as coplaintiffs to sue for their respective
injuries. Despite their similarity in that respect, this is not that case.
Considering the quarter from which the objection to such crossactions usually comes, it is apparent that attorneys for the codefendants
feel that it is tactically and psychologically advantageous to get rid of the
cross-claims. 65 It is doubtful that this would be a good basis for dismissal; nor is it the reason judicially given for dismissal. It is equally
true that the attorney for the claiming defendant feels that it is tactically
and psychologically advantageous to have the claim litigated with his
compulsory counterclaim. Since the equities here are somewhat balanced, and since no statute prohibits it, the joinder should be permitted
on the ground of trial convenience alone; and if a party, in a particular
case, can demonstrate real prejudice by virtue of his joinder, the court
has adequate power to order separate trials.
To the extent that disapproval of joinder, or the ordering of separate
trials, or the denial of consolidation, may be grounded upon the desire
to eliminate confusion or to make jury cases more simple, it is reasonable
to inquire whether such uncomplicated simplicity is achieved if achieved
at the expense of reality. In those accidents where participants are
numerous and mayhem is multiple, the just assessment of legal liability
is necessarily a complex problem. The isolation of a fragment of the
problem will cater to the ancient desire, so attractive (and elusive) to
the common law pleader, to narrow every controversy to a single issue.
It will also hasten the day when some other method will be devised
for resolving highway cases-some method undoubtedly more complicated, but also more realistic and more efficient than a method which
finds its criteria in the dichotomy of causes of action, the irrelevance of
one driver's smashed ribs to the other driver's broken nose, and solici04 "Whether all persons suffering injury or damage arising out of one and the
same motor vehicle collision should be permitted to join as coplaintiffs against the
allegedly negligent motorist is for the General Assembly to decide. The Court
studiously refrains from making law by judicial fiat. It only applies it as it is
written." Wrenn v. Graham, 236 N. C. 719, 722-23, 74 S. E. 2d 232, 234 (1952).
" Not even the authors of this article are wholly insensitive to such considerations. They have, for example, some appreciation for the predicament of an attorney faced with the decision as to whether to claim conditionally for contribution
or indemnification against both plaintiff and the defendant driver. But, if consolidation is granted, he is (by his own apparent appraisal) back behind the psychological eight ball. And if consolidation is not granted, we have the attorney for
defendant driver juggling two parts of what is really a single suit, deeply puzzled
as to how he should jockey before the calendar committee.
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tude for the special rights of the promptly litigous soul who grabs the
label of plaintiff.
ALTERNATIVE JOINDER

As previously pointed out in connection with the discussion of joinder
of parties, G. S. § 1-68 and G. S. § 1-69 permit joinder of plaintiffs or
defendants in the alternative. The operation of the statutes is relatively
clear where the Court finds that only one cause of action is involved.
However, in cases where several causes are involved, it is still far from
clear whether the requirement of G. S. § 1-123 that all causes must affect
all parties will prevent alternative joinder.
At the time the original article was written, there was authority
which found misjoinder by emphasizing inconsistency, virtually ignoring
the alternative joinder provisions; and there was authority permitting
joinder by emphasizing the alternative joinder provisions, virtually ignoring inconsistency. 6 The two lines of authority still exist.
The inconsistency approach was followed in Foote Brothers Co. v.
Davis Co. 67 There, the defendant allegedly breached a contract to purchase prunes, and was sued by Foote Brothers. Defendant answered,
alleging it dealt with plaintiff company only as an agent or broker and
that Guggenhime Company was the vendor and real party in interest.
Guggenhime, upon motion of plaintiff, 6 was thereupon made a party
plaintiff and filed a complaint seeking to recover in its own right. The
trial court overruled defendant's demurrer for misjoinder of parties and
causes. In reversing the ruling, the Supreme Court did not mention
alternative joinder, but held that the two causes were contradictory, and'
that there was no joint or common interest in the claim asserted.
This seems to be a case where a practical approach with a view to
trial convenience should have permitted joinder. There was actually
only one claim involved, with the only problem being which plaintiff was
entitled to recover on the single contract. No alternative facts were
involved, and since all parties were apparently in doubt as to which
plaintiff was entitled to recover, it would seem to be a case where the
alternative joinder statute should have been applicable. Had the Court
chosen to follow it, there was ample authority for this joinder even prior
to enactment of the alternative joinder sections.60 If the case means that
' Brandis, supra note 1, pp. 43-49.
07230 N. C. 422, 53 S. E. 2d 311 (1949).
"The Court emphasized that Guggenhime came in on motion of plaintiff and
therefore, could not take advantage of the notion that a newly added party has
special privileges in making claims against the original party responsible for his
presence. See Grant v. McGraw, supra note 53. However, defendant's plea that
Guggenhime was the real party in interest should be an adequate substitute for a
motion by defendant to have Guggenhime joined. In fact, accepting the plea at
face value, Guggenhime was a necessary party.
"0There are several cases indicating that where plaintiffs are uncertain as to
which has the right of action or is the real party in interest, they may join without
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the joinder was improper because of omission of alternative statements
it is unduly literal. If it means that such joinder would not be permitted,
even if stated in the alternative, it disregards the alternative joinder
70
statute. On either hypothesis, the decision comes in the wrong century.
A welcome contrast is a case in which the Supreme Court looked to
the alternative provisions of G. S. § 1-69 to justify joinder of defendants. 71 Plaintiff brought an action for false arrest on the part of a deputy
sheriff, alleging that the deputy was acting within the scope of his private
employment by two beach owners, and was at the same time acting under
color of his office. The deputy, the sheriff, the surety on their bonds and
the beach owners were all joined as defendants. The trial court sustained
demurrers for misjoinder of parties and causes. The Supreme Court
reversed, indicating that whether the deputy was acting in his capacity
as servant or public officer was a question of fact for the jury, and furthermore, that where a plaintiff is in doubt as to persons from whom he
is entitled to redress, he may join two or more defendants to determine
72
which is liable.
The result is certainly commendable. However, the pleadings gave
no indication that plaintiff intended to join defendants in the alternative.
On the contrary, it seems that he was attempting to hold all of them
jointly liable. Therefore, reconciliation of this case with the Foote case
is impossible unless it be on the ground that G. S. § 1-68, dealing with
alternative joinder of plaintiffs, does not expressly contain a provision
like that in G. S. § 1-69; "If a plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from
whom he is entitled to redress, he may join two or more defendants to
making the joinder one expressly in the alternative. Brandis, supra note 1, n. 206.
In fact, several cases antedating the alternative joinder provisions in effect permitted alternative joinder by invoking the rule that joinder of an unnecessary
party is surplusage. See Brandis, supra note 1, n. 34, and cases cited therein.
Sometimes the Court settles the matter by merely saying that, if the defendant is
liable, it makes no difference to him who gets the money so long as either plaintiff is the rightful claimant, since both will be bound by the judgment. See Brandis,
supra note 1, n. 34.
"' With due apologies to Baron Surrebutter, the following dialogue might be
an appropriate commentary on this case:
Judge: "We had a most interesting case the other day. Foote sued Davis for a
debt and Davis said that, if he owed the money at all, he owed it to Guggenhime."
Layman: "I suppose you sent for Guggenhime?"
Judge: "Oh yes, we did that because Foote requested it."
Layman: "Well it's nice that you could get them all together and settle the matter
once and for all."
Judge: "My dear fellow, you overlook the very point which gives this case its
interest. We threw them all out of court."
" State ex rel Cain v. Corbett, 235 N. C. 33, 69 S. E. 2d 20 (1952).
" The Court found that the complaint stated only one cause of action, with
additional allegations pertaining to malicious prosecution having been inserted
relative to punitive damages. Once this was determined, the application of the
alternative joinder provisions became (legalistically speaking), simple. Furthermore, had the Court not permitted the joinder, any improperly joined parties would
probably have been dismissed or treated as mere surplusage; thus the consequences
to plaintiff would not have been serious.
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determine which is liable." However, the mere authorization of alternative joinder of plaintiffs so plainly contemplates a comparable uncertainty, that such a ground of distinction seems highly improbable. Further, if this is the distinction, the Court failed to mention it.
Clearly, the Court has yet to give a thorough consideration to the
alternative joinder statutes in the light of the modern trend toward procedural reform-the trend which produced them and which furnishes
the principle clues to their proper interpretation.
CONSEQUENCES OF MISJOINDER OF PARTIES AND CAUSES

Demurrer is the proper method to raise the objection to improper
joinder of parties and causes, and failure to demur waives the objection;
however, in some such cases the Court will nevertheless call attention to
73
the improper joinder.
Where a demurrer for "dual misjoinder" is sustained, severance is
not allowed as in the case of improper joinder of causes alone, nor may
amendment, eliminating misjoinder be allowed, and the action must be
dismissed. 74 Needless to say, this practice imposes a great hardship upon
plaintiffs, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal is usually without
prejudice and new actions may be begun. Plaintiffs are burdened by
the time and expense involved in beginning new actions as well as the
paying of costs in the original actions.
Plaintiffs sometimes escape complete dismissal because the Court
finds that no cause of action is stated against one of the improperly
joined parties.75 The same is true where a demurrer for failure to state
a cause of action is sustained as to the entire complaint. 76 In the latter
type of case, plaintiffs may be permitted to amend and thus, if they see
fit, revise the joinder before there is a definite ruling. There are also
cases where the Court has allowed the misjoinder to be eliminated by
" McKinley v. Hinnant, 242 N. C. 245, 87 S. E. 2d 568 (1955) ; Eller v. R. R.,
140 N. C. 140, 52 S.E. 305 (1905). A demurrer for failure to state a cause of
action does not present for decision whether the complaint is objectionable for misjoinder of parties and causes. Batchelor v. Mitchel, 238 N. C. 351, 78 S. E. 2d
240 (1953).
"'Johnson v. Scarborough, 242 N. C. 681, 89 S.E. 2d 420 (1955) ; Teague v.
Siler City Oil Co., 232 N. C. 469, 61 S. E. 2d 2 (1950) ; Davis v. Whitehurst, 229
N. C. 226, 49 S.E. 2d 394 (1948).
"Jordan v. Maynard, 231 N. C. 101, 56 S. E. 2d 26 (1949). Held, in suit
against insured and insurer, demurrer for misjoinder of parties and causes is improperly granted when the complaint fails to state a cause of action against insurer.
Case remanded with order to dismiss insurer and continue against insured. Shaw
v. Barnard, 229 N. C. 713, 57 S.E. 2d 295 (1948). Where multiple plaintiffs are
involved and the Court finds that only one states a cause of action, dual misjoinder
will not be found. Wetherton v. Whitford Motor Co., Inc., 240 N. C. 90, 81 S.E.
2d 267 (1954). See also Shelby v. Lackey, 236 N. C. 369, 72 S.E. 2d 757 (1952).
6 Temple v. Watson, 227 N. C. 242, 31 S.E. 2d 738 (1947).
The trial court
sustained defendant's demurrer for failure to state a cause of action and overruled
a demurrer for misjoinder of parties and causes. The Supreme Court held that,
upon the sustaining of the demurrer on the first ground, there was nothing left to
which the demurrer on the second ground could be directed.
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amendment after a demurrer was interposed, but before a decision was
made sustaining it.7
Another development in this area occurred with the case of Teague
v. Siler City Oil Co.78 There the trial court overruled defendants' demurrer for misjoinder of causes and parties and the Supreme Court
reversed. 79 After the opinion was certified down but before final judgment, the trial court refused to hear plaintiffs' motion to amend, ruling
that the Supreme Court decision on the demurrer operated to dismiss the
action, thereby leaving the trial court without authority to hear a motion
to amend. On appeal, the Supreme Court said that the effect of its
reversal was not to sustain the demurrer, but to order the lower court
to do so.80 Therefore, the action was still pending, and the lower court
could hear a motion to amend at any time before it rendered final judgment.
This is truly a nice distinction. It does no violence to purely technical concepts. The practical situation, however, is incongruous. If the
lower court judge correctly (in the view of the Supreme Court) sustains
the demurrer, no power to permit amendment exists in any court.8 ' But
if he incorrectly overrules the demurrer, and is corrected by the Supreme
Court, there is power to permit amendment if the plaintiff's attorney acts
in time. Perhaps plaintiffs' attorneys should be duly thankful for small
technical favors; but elucidating the niceties of the distinction to the
general public, which stubbornly harbors notions that everybody should
be fed from the same spoon, is somewhat difficult.

THim

PARTY PRACTICE
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G. S. § 1-240 grants a defendant express authority to have an alleged
joint tort-feasor joined for purposes of contribution.8 3 No such right
"' Sparks v. Sparks, 290 N. C. 715, 55 S.E. 2d 477 (1949); Walker v. Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey, 222 N. C. 607, 24 S. E. 2d 254 (1943); Campbell v. Washington Light and Power Co., 166 N. C. 488, 82 S. E. 842 (1914).
18232 N. C. 469, 61 S. E. 2d 345 (1950).
10 See Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 194 (1951).
60 The Supreme Court may render final judgment, but the general practice is to
send the case down with direction to the lower court to enter judgment in accordance with the decision on appeal. MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE IN CIViL CASES, § 694(6) (1929).
" "Whether decision of this Court affirming a judgment which sustains a demurrer for misjoinder of.parties and causes cuts off the right to apply for leave to
amend is not here presented. While decisions seem to answer in the affirmative,
we leave the question without obiter comment." Teague v. Silver City Oil Co., 232
N. C. 469, 472, 61 S.E. 2d 345, 347 (1950).
2 The discussion under this topic is related more clearly to the second than to
the first Brandis article cited in note 1. However, no attempt will be made here to
follow the organization of the second article or to deal with every subject it covered.
"3Where a newspaper was sued alone for alleged libel, it was held that the newspaper was entitled to have joined, as a joint tort-feasor, an individual who allegedly
composed the libelous matter and had it published as a paid advertisement. Taylor
v. Kinston Free Press Co., 237 N. C. 551, 75 S. E. 2d 528 (1953). In Yandell v.
Fireproofing Corp., 239 N. C. 1, 79 S. E. 2d 223 (1953), an employee of consignee
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existed prior to the enactment of the statute, though it had long been
recognized that a defendant could have a third party brought in on allegations of primary liability, and could demand judgment over against
him for the full amount recovered by the plaintiff. 84 Such practice, of
course, is still permitted, quite apart from G. S. 1-240.
For- example, this principle was used to justify joinder in Davis v.
Radford,8 5 where a retailer who was sued for breach of an implied warranty that an article sold was fit for human consumption had his distributor joined as third party defendant. The cross-complaint alleged
that the distributor had impliedly waranted that the article was fit for
human consumption and was therefore primarily liable for injuries resulting from its breach. Likewise, where defendant was sued by an
owner of adjacent property for damages resulting from excavation for
a building on defendant's property, defendant was allowed to join and
set up the primary liability of his contractor, predicated on the contractor's active negligence.8 6
On the other hand, where the suit was against a contractor for breach
of contract on the ground that a roof had been defectively constructed,
the defendant contractor was not permitted to have his subcontractor
joined upon allegations that if the roof were defective, the subcontractor
had failed to erect it in accord with specifications and was consequently
liable to the plaintiff and defendant contractor.8 7 The Court regarded
G. S. § 1-240 as inapplicable since the contractor and subcontractor were
not joint tort-feasors, and, of course, since the suit was for breach of a
sued the initial and delivering carriers, and the agent charged with inspecting the
freight car where injuries were received. Defendants were allowed to join the
shipper who had loaded the car in an allegedly dangerous manner. In regarding
the complaint as stating facts indicating concurrent negligence, the Court said:
"Concurrent negligence consists of two or more persons, concurring not necessarily
in point of time, but in point of consequence in producing a single, indivisible injury." Id. at 9-10, 79 S. E. 2d, 223, 229. The only initial liability of the added
defendant in such case is on the cross-claim for contribution; therefore, unless
plaintiff amends to seek judgment against him, it is error for the Court to enter
judgment for plaintiff against the added defendant. Pascal v. Burke Transit Co.,
229 N. C. 435, 50 S. E. 2d 534 (1948).

8' See Brandis, A Plea for Adoption by North Carolina of the Federal Joinder
Rules, 25 N. C. L. REv. 245, 263-68 (1947).

85233 N. C. 283, 63 S. E. 2d 822 (1951).
The fact that the cross-complaint
alleged both negligence and implied warranty theories received little attention.
" Wright's Clothing Store v. Ellis Stone Co., 233 N. C. 126, 63 S. E. 2d 118
(1951).
"' Gaither Corp. v. Skinner, 238 N. C. 254, 77 S. E. 2d 659 (1953). The Court
did not mention either of the cases in notes 84 and 85, but cited Bd. of Education
v. Deitrick, 221 N. C. 38, 18 S. E. 2d 704 (1942). There a general contractor, who
had been sued for using green and defective lumber in a building, moved to join the
lumber dealer from whom he had obtained the material. It was held that his
motion was properly denied because there was no privity between plaintiff and the
lumber dealer, and the contractor and lumber dealer were not joint tort-feasors.
For a discussion of the case see Brandis, supra note 84, p. 265.
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contract on which only the original defendant was liable, no issue of
primary and secondary liability arose.
While there may be technical distinctions between this case and the
Davis case,88 there seems to be little practical reason for permitting the
joinder in that situation while denying it here. Of course, in the Davis
case, the plaintiff could have sued the third party defendant directly; but
here, the Court also concedes that the plaintiff might have brought action
directly against the subcontractor.8 9 Moreover, in a subsequent action,
the contractor could obviously look to the subcontractor for any damages
paid the plaintiff which resulted from the subcontractor's negligence or
breach of his contract. It would therefore seem that the ultimate rights
as between the two parties should be determined in the one action. The
similar factor of the Davis case was emphasized as a reason for permitting joinder. 0
In order to bring in an additional defendant, either under G. S. §1-240
or under allegations of primary liability a defendant must allege facts
sufficient to indicate that both defendants, are or may be liable to plaintiff,9 ' and that plaintiff, by timely assertions, could claim rights against
the party added.9 2 Hence, it follows that where the defendant alleges
only that the negligence of another defendant was the sole proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury, the cross-action will not be sustained. 93 The
8 In the Davis case, the retail dealer alleged that he purchased the article from
the distributor in sealed container under a warranty of wholesomeness, and that he
sold to the consumer with the same warranty. In the instant case, there were clearly
two contracts involved and the subcontractor was not liable on the contract upon
which plaintiff sued.
"' The Court indicated that plaintiff could have sued the subcontractor as a third
party beneficiary to the contract between the defendant and subcontractor.
"0It is possible to interpret the Skinner case as involving only affirmance of a
discretionary refusal by the judge below to add a new party. If this is the correct
interpretation, then the judge would also be sustained if he added the new party.
"Hayes v. Wilmington, 243 N. C. 525, 81 S. E. 2d 673 (1956); Kimsey v.
Reaves, 242 N. C. 721, 89 S. E. 2d 386 (1955) ; Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc.,
242 N. C. 67, 86 S. E. 2d 780 (1955) ; Hobbs v. Goodman, 240 N. C. 192, 81 S. E.
2d 413 (1954).
" Thus, in an action for the wrongful death of a child, a defendant may not have
the mother of the child joined upon allegations of ordinary negligence, because had
the child lived he would have had no right of action against the mother. Billings
v. Taylor, 243 N. C. 57, 89 S. E. 2d 743 (1955). See also Hayes v. Wilmington,
239 N. C. 238, 79 S. E. 2d 792 (1954) ; Hobbs v. Goodman, supra note 91.
The Workmen's Compensation Act abrogates all common law liability of a
covered employer to employee for an injury by accident in employment. Consequently, a defendant who is sued for negligently inflicting a compensable injury
upon an employee cannot have the employer joined under G. S. § 1-240 or upon
allegations of primary liability. Hunsucker v. High Point Chair Co., 237 N. C. 559,
75 S. E. 2d 768 (1953) ; Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N. C. 663, 73 S. E. 2d 886 (1953);
Bass v. Ingold, 232 N. C. 295, 60 . E. 2d 106 (1950).
83 Kimsey v. Reaves, 242 N. C. 721, 89 S. E. 2d 386 (1955) ; Potter v. Frosty
Morn Meats, Inc., 242 N. C. 67, 86 S. E. 2d 780 (1955); Hayes v. Wilmington,
239 N. C. 238, 79 S. E. 2d 792 (1954). Normally, the defendant asserts claims
against codefendant X on a contingent basis, alleging: (1) no negligence on defendant's part; (2) that plaintiff's injury was caused solely by the negligence of
X; (3) that, if defendant is found liable to plaintiff, X's negligence concurred with
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same is true where the cross-claim alleges facts which indicate the codefendant is only secondarily liable to the claiming defendant.0 4

In Hayes v. Wilmington,95 both objections appeared applicable to
defendant's pleadings. The cause arose when plaintiff's intestate was
killed by a gas explosion in the plaintiff's home. Action was brought
against the city and certain contractors, upon allegations that excavating
machines of one of the contractors had struck gas pipes underneath the
surface of the ground, causing the explosion. The contractor sought to
have the power company which owned the gas pipes brought into the
case on the ground that it was negligent in (1) installing pipes too near
the surface of the ground; (2) failing to lower then upon notice of the
planned excavations; and (3) failing to install properly a meter and
governor at the plaintiff's residence. It was further alleged that the negligence of the power company was the sole proximate cause of the intestate's death. The trial court granted the motion of the power company
to strike its name, and the Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that
no allegations of concurrent negligence were contained in the crossclaims. The Court further found that the allegations of the contractor,
when related to those of the plaintiff, indicated that any negligence of
the power company was only passive and consequently secondary to that
of the contractor. The power company was subsequently brought back
into the case after the contractor's answer was amended to include a
cross-claim containing allegations of concurrent negligence. The trial
court once again granted the power company's motion to strike its name.
However, the Supreme Court reversed, with the majority being of the
opinion that the amended complaint stated a cause of action against the
power company for contribution.96
The portion of the prior opinion
dealing with the primary negligence of the contractor was regarded as
7

obiter dictum.9

A rather unusual use of G. S. § 1-240 was attempted in the case of
his in producing plaintiff's injury and he is entitled to judgment against X for
contribution. See, approving such pleadings, Hayes v. Wilmington, infra note 96;
Read v. Roofing Co., 234 N. C. 273, 66 S. E. 2d 821 (1951). A similar form is
used in alleging primary liability and seeking indemnification, and no reason appears why contribution and indemnification could not be sought in the alternative.
:'Hayes v. Wilmington, 239 N. C. 238, 79 S. E. 2d 792 (1954).
Ibid.
°7 Hayes v. Wilmington, 243 N. C. 525, 91 S. E. 2d 673 (1956).
' In a strong dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Barnhill regarded the judgment
in the previous case as having been based on the conclusion that the negligent acts
of the original defendants had insulated those of the power company. He further
dissented on the ground that the original appeal was from the trial court's action
in granting a motion to strike, in which case the judgment of the Supreme Court
became final when defendants failed to petition for a rehearing. "On the original
appeal all parties treated the motion just as it was-a motion to strike. The majority now seek to make it a demurrer ore tenus so as to justify the novel procedure
adopted to reverse the original opinion without saying so." Hayes v. Wilmington,
243 N. C. 525, 544, 91 S. E. 2d 673, 690 (1956).
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Fleming v. CarolinaPower and Light Company.98 Action was brought
to recover for the loss of a warehouse caused by the defendant's alleged
negligence. Defendant answered inter alia that plaintiff was a joint tortfeasor; brought in insurers of third parties who had sustained losses as
a result of the fire; and set up a cross-action against plaintiff for contribution. The trial court allowed the joinder; however the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that G. S. § 1-240 does not authorize such procedure in order to force third parties to prosecute their claims in plaintiff's action. 99
While this article is not concerned with the problem of res judicata,
brief mention may be made of some significant principles as they apply
to the third party practice field.100 It is clear that where a plaintiff seeks
no affirmative relief from a party who has been joined for the purpose
of contribution, a judgment for the original defendant does not preclude
the plaintiff from subsequently suing the party so joined. 1' 1 It would
also follow that a plaintiff may join two tort-feasors whose negligence as
between themselves has been determined in a former action. But where
only one defendant is sued and another is brought in solely for contribution, any prior judgment pertaining to the issue of negligence between
10 2
the two defendants may properly be pleaded as res judicata.
CONSOLIDATION

The consolidation device affords at least minimum relief from our
strict joinder statutes. In effect, it allows a trial judge to consolidate
independent actions involving the same parties and the same subject
matter if no prejudicial or harmful complications will result therefrom. 103 Its purpose is to avoid multiplicity of suits and unnecessary
costs and delays ;104 however, it cannot be said to be an effective substitute for free joinder.
The Court itself recognizes that consolidation is not the equivalent of
joinder, but quite properly takes the position that the existence of the
consolidation power does not justify disregard of the joinder statutes.10 5
-8230 N. C. 65, 50 S. E. 2d 45 (1949).
"' The defendant's counterclaim and cross-action alleged a type of "squeeze

play" whereby insurers were attempting to foreclose defendant's defenses in a
single action or coerce it into making compromise settlements in order to avoid
the harassment and expense of having to defend a multiplicity of actions.
100 For a more thorough discussion of the res judicata doctrine, see Leonard,
Pleading and Prozing the Defense of Res Judicata in Nrorth Carolina. 34 N. C. L.
Rxv.101458
(1956).
Powell
v. Ingram, 231 N. C. 427, 57 S. E. 2d 315 (1950).
.02 Tarkington v. Rock Hill Printing Co., 230 N. C. 354, 53 S. E. 2d 269 (1949).
10 Peoples v. Seaboard Air Line R. R., 228 N. C. 590, 46 S. E. 2d 649 (1948).
104

Ibid.

"Had appellant elected to institute a separate and independent action against
plaintiff and the corporate defendant, the trial judge, in his discretion could have
consolidated the two actions for trial. This is a roundabout way to the same end
appellant seeks to accomplish here. Nevertheless, the statute does not permit the
joinder of the two causes as a matter of right." Barnhill, J., in Wrenn v. Graham,
102
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Occasionally, however, its existence is used as a minor make-weight in
1 °6
a decision sustaining joinder.
There is perhaps a suggestion in one case 10 7 that consolidation should
not ordinarily be used when there are issues not common to all the
causes. There the actions, against the same defendant, were brought by
the driver of a car and his passengers. Because his case alone included
an issue of contributory negligence, the Court said it would be better to
try his case separately. The lower court judgment was reversed because
the judge's charge was found to be conflicting, and this is what motivated
the Court's observation. However, such narrow use of consolidation
would worsen rather than better our situation. Though one judge, in
a particular case, had difficulty in giving the jury clear instructions, it
does not follow that judges in general will have difficulty in doing so.
While permissible complexity is certainly not infinite and lines must be
drawn somewhere,'0 " this situation was not particularly complex, 00 and
trial convenience and efficient use of the court's time both favor continued
consolidation of such cases. And the opinion does not seem to indicate
that a judge ordering such consolidation would be reversed for abuse of
discretion.
CONCLUSION
The last ten years have produced no changes in the basic joinder
statutes* and no significant new departures in judicial interpretation
of those statutes. A few cases reflect a more technicaL approach than
our Court brought to joinder problems in the past, and a few reflect a
less technical approach. Perhaps the cases reflecting a more technical
approach slightly outnumber the less technical ones; but there is no clear
trend in either direction.
Both the number and the character of joinder cases being steadily
presented indicate that more and more attorneys are seeking (and often
failing) to accomplish joinder which is clearly permissible in jurisdictions
where the procedural system has been overhauled and modernized. Per236 N. C. 719, 722, 74 S. E. 2d 232, 234 (1953).

(The authors have heretofore

taken issue with the interpretation placed on the joinder statutes in this case, but
they do not criticize the principle stated as to the relation between statutory joinder
and statutory consolidation.)
106 "Should we order a severance and require Clifford Grant and H. E. Grant
to institute independent actions, the court below would have authority to, and
probably would, order a consolidation for trial ... why march up the bill just to
march down again?" Barnhill, J., in Grant v. McGraw, 228 N. C. 745, 747, 46

S. E. 72d 849, 851 (1948).
" Dixon v. Brockwell, 227 N. C. 567, 42 S. E. 2d 680 (1947).
10' Cf. the comments, supra under "Rules Apply to Defendant's Pleadings."

"09 Grant v. McGraw, quoted in note 102, involved the same issues as were involved in Dixon v. Brockwell, supra, note 103. There is no suggestion in the Grant
opinion that separate trials should be had.
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haps there will one day be enough of them to bring to bear effective
pressure from the bar, obviously lacking heretofore, to put North Carolina in line with the modem trend. Meanwhile, although handicapped
by the restrictive provisions of our statutes, our Court could bring us
closer to the modem trend by removing those restrictions not plainly
dictated by the statutes.

